Standard practice is to benchmark managerial performance against best observed practice, because engineering information is rarely available. We exploit a rare opportunity to benchmark managerial performance against engineering standards. Our managerial performance describes the activities of Spanish electricity distributors, and our engineering standards are obtained from an engineering grid created by an international consultancy. We find the consultancy's network to be much less costly to operate. When we decompose the cost differential, we find that the superior network design, combined with lower input prices, accounts for more than all of the predicted cost savings. However we also find that the managers are more cost efficient than the consultancy, presumably because they exploit their incentive to be cost efficient under a revenue cap regulatory regime.
network to the Ministerio and the other distributors. The Ministerio then commissioned an international consultancy to validate the feasibility of the ideal network. The motivation of the Ministerio was apparently the same as that of CSEN, to update the decade-old RPI-0 regulatory system. The Ministerio and the distributors have met periodically since then, in an ongoing effort to reach a final agreement concerning both the structure of the ideal network and a revision of the standard cost framework on which distributors' revenues are determined.
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In 1997 another law, "Ley 54/97 del Sector Electrico," was enacted to introduce competition into electricity generation and to dismantle the vertical integration of the distributors.
It also recognized the consultancy's ideal network as a benchmark with which to regulate electricity distribution. This ideal network considered the structure of demand as being exogenously determined, its structure being governed by location, peak demand and type of voltage required. On this basis it proposed both an ideal network incorporating a high level of service quality, and a set of ideal input prices. The reason it proposed ideal input prices is that they are required to adjust the standard cost framework in order to set revised revenue caps. The consultancy's ideal network has been controversial, and alternatives have been proposed by the distributor Unión Eléctrica Fenosa and by the Endesa group. The distributor Iberdrola claims that regulation using any ideal network presents such difficulties that it is better to reform the old revenue cap system, in the belief that any such network would be unfair to urban distributors and infeasible in light of environmental and zoning restrictions. This controversy has impeded the regulatory use of the ideal network ever since its adoption after the passage of the 1997 law. The consequence of this lack of agreement is that the regulator is using Grifell-Tatjé, E. And C. A.K. Lovell (2003) , "The Managers vs. the Consultants", The Scandinavian Journal of Economics vol. 105, issue 1, pages 119 -138. DOI: 10.1111 DOI: 10. /1467 it, but in an unclear way. Nonetheless it has made Spain a pioneering country in regulating electricity distribution using an engineering benchmark grid rather than yardstick competition. 6 As a consequence of this chain of events, we have access to a pair of data sets. One is contained in ATLAS, and describes the network as it existed in 1996. The other describes the consultancy's ideal engineering network. The former is the result of many years of managerial decisions based on growth in demand, a concomitant increase in market power, and continuing regulation based on economic incentives. The latter is the result of the consultancy's effort to design an ideal network from scratch, in light of current technology and current and projected future demand. The two differ substantially.
III. The Two Data Sets
Our actual data set describes the 1996 operations of nine distributors, each of which operates in one or more of 47 provinces. Allocating distributor operations to provinces generates a total of 68 distributor/province observations on which we base our analysis. We have excluded the island provinces of Canarias and Baleares, and we have deleted one atypical mainland distributor/province observation (Unión Eléctrica Fenosa's facility in the province of Lugo) because it provides electricity primarily to a single large aluminium producer, and its initial inclusion distorted the empirical results.
The data were provided to us by CSEN. The primary data source is ATLAS, which contains information on inputs and outputs at the distributor/province level. The variable list is fairly conventional, although the inclusion of service territory area and service reliability among the outputs, and the disaggregation of the line and transformer capacity inputs, makes it more detailed than most variable lists. 7 The list does not contain a labor input, because labor expenses are embedded in the operating cost of the other inputs.
Actual and ideal outputs are the same, in both definition and magnitude. Actual inputs are available in ATLAS at the distributor/province level. Ideal inputs were calculated at the municipality and industrial area level, based on various indicators of electricity demand, and aggregated to the distributor/province level.
The MLE provides a framework for reimbursement based on an allowed "standard cost" for distributing high, medium and low voltage electricity. This is the only available source of The consultancy's ideal input prices are determined quite differently, from more detailed information. Their procedure begins with three types of operating cost: maintenance, repair and preparedness. Each includes labor cost, and each is defined at municipality or industrial areas.
The first two cost components are defined on a per-unit basis for each input, and must be aggregated to the distributor/province level based on the ideal input vectors. The third cost component is defined at the distributor/province level, and must be allocated to inputs based on their expected failure frequencies. All three cost components vary across provinces, which have The two data sets are summarized, for the nine distributors rather than for all 68 distributor/province observations, in Tables 1 -3 . Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the enormous size disparity among the distributors, as well as the dominance of the Endesa group (CSE, ENHER, ERZ, EV, FECSA and HECSA) and Iberdrola. Table 2 illustrates the difference between the actual network and the consultancy's ideal network. Aggregate resource use is lower for all five inputs in the consultancy's network. In only six instances does the consultancy recommend an increased use of a particular input. 8 Table 3 illustrates the difference between actual input prices and those proposed by the consultancy. The consultancy recommends average decreases in three input prices, and average increases in the prices of MV and HV lines. The pattern of recommended price changes is generally consistent across distributors, although there are a few exceptions.
In conjunction with the consultancy's smaller ideal network, its ideal input price structure implies that its ideal operating cost is 28% lower than the actual operating cost. Adoption of the consultancy's recommendations would have generated operating cost savings of nearly 300 million euros. The former describes the best the managers can do with their actual network and the consultancy's ideal input prices, and the latter describes the best the consultancy can do with its ideal network and the managers' actual input prices. Since the managers and the consultancy face the same output demands, we do not attach a superscript to y in any of the four cost frontiers.
The four cost frontiers are depicted in Figure 1 The two decompositions identify the same three sources of cost difference. The first component attributes a portion of the cost differential to differences in network design; the consultancy's ideal network may be less costly to operate at either input price vector. The second component attributes a portion of the cost differential to input price differences; the consultancy's ideal input price vector may lead to lower cost regardless of which distribution network is used.
The third component attributes the remainder of the cost differential to differences in cost efficiency; since the consultancy has simultaneously designed both an ideal network and an ideal The two decompositions share a common cost efficiency differential, but they have different network design and input price differentials because they are based on different hypothetical cost frontiers. The first decomposition evaluates the network design differential at the managers' input vector w o , and evaluates the input price differential using the consultancy's network c*(•). The second decomposition evaluates the network design differential at the consultancy's input vector w*, and evaluates the input price differential using the managers' network c o (•).
We expect the two network design differentials to be similar, and the two input price In contrast to Decompositions 1 and 2, the mean form Decomposition 3 is based on all four cost frontiers, and so it requires finding all four unobserved cost-efficient input vectors identified in Figure 1 and defined beneath Decomposition 2. However the mean form decomposition has indexes, one using the managers' network and the other using the consultancy's ideal network.
Thus the mean form decomposition has an attractive theoretical foundation.
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V. The Empirical Technique
Decomposing the cost differential requires finding the four unobserved cost-efficient input
, which requires solving four cost minimization problems. We use linear programming techniques described in Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) to do so. The general form of these four linear programming problems is 
VI. The Empirical Findings
We Table 4 , which summarizes the decomposition by distributor rather than by distributor/province observation.
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The final three rows of Table 3 demonstrate that the actual network operates at a cost that is nearly 300 million euros, or nearly 40%, higher than the cost of operating the consultancy's ideal network. Thus the consultancy's ideal network has the potential to achieve a 28% cost saving. This cost saving is widespread, and applies to the seven largest distributors. It is this potential cost saving that we wish to decompose into its constituent sources. Table 4 demonstrates that 69% of the potential cost saving is attributable to the fact that the consultancy proposes lower input prices, in the aggregate and for the seven largest distributors.
49% of the potential cost saving is due to the fact that the consultancy proposes a leaner network, in the aggregate and for all nine distributors. Neither of these findings is surprising, since the consultancy's engineers were unencumbered by history. The consultancy's network was designed solely on the basis of current and projected future demand, and without the structural constraints imposed by past developments, while much of the actual network was built years ago before demand evolved to its current level and geographic distribution. It is noteworthy, however, that these two sources exceed the total cost saving.
It follows that the consultancy's ideal network is not as cost efficient as the actual network.
This gives the managers a countervailing 18% cost advantage, amounting to 53 million euros, over the consultancy. The superior cost efficiency of the actual network is widespread, applying to seven of nine distributors. There are at least two plausible explanations for the superior cost efficiency of the actual network. First, the consultancy's network was designed by engineers rather than by economists, and while the engineers developed a superior network design, they were less concerned with its cost efficiency. With this in mind, Gómez and Pacheco (2000) and GERE (2000) have proposed a revision of the engineering procedure used to build the ideal network. Second, the standard cost reimbursement scheme allows managers to retain excess revenues, and the standard cost parameters have not been adjusted for improvements in productivity since 1987. This provides managers with a powerful incentive to be cost efficient.
Superior allocative efficiency gained through years of managerial experience is the driving 
VII. Conclusions
We have exploited an unusual opportunity to benchmark the managers' performance against engineering standards established by an international consultancy. The usual practice is to benchmark against best observed practice, because engineering information is rarely available.
The distinction is important, because the consultancy's network was designed solely on the basis of currently available technology and current and projected future demand, and without the structural constraints imposed by outdated technology and past developments, while much of the existing network was built years ago before technology advanced and demand evolved to its current level and geographic distribution.
Our actual performance describes the 1996 activities of Spanish electricity distributors, for which we have a total of 68 distributor/province observations. Our engineering standards are obtained by aggregating detailed information generated by the consultancy to the same distributor/province level.
As expected, we find that the network design differential and the input price differential both favor the consultancy's ideal network. However since the ideal network was designed by engineers rather than by economists, we also find that the incumbent managers are more costefficient than the consultants because they exploit their incentive to be allocatively efficient under the revenue cap regulatory regime. Since the ideal network does not allocate inputs in a Nonetheless the consultancy's ideal network has the potential to serve the regulator well, as a substitute for yardstick competition in a market supplied by so few distributors that implementing yardstick competition would require the introduction of international comparators of dubious relevance. We find that the regulator is achieving part of this potential. The regulator is using it to justify a reallocation of the aggregate revenue cap among distributors. However there is little evidence to suggest that the regulator is also using it to reallocate monopoly rents away from distributors toward consumers by setting a positive X so as to reduce the aggregate revenue cap.
66KV, 50KV or 45KV) to medium voltage as defined for lines, and in terms of the capacity to transform medium voltage to a lower medium voltage as defined for lines. We define the second substation input in terms of the capacity to transform medium voltage to low voltage, both as defined for lines. 9. It is worth noting that the standard operating cost of 1,048 million euros we are examining is just over one third of standard total cost allocated to the distributors. 11. For more on the Konüs price index and related matters, see Balk (1998 
